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1. Introduction
2019 marks the 30th anniversary of the beginning of 
democratic changes in Bulgaria. While neighbouring 
Romania underwent a bloody revolution, and Yugo-
slavia, a series of violent civil wars, Bulgaria managed 
to go thought the system change peacefully. There 
was a fundamental shift in the geopolitical position 
of Bulgaria in that period. Ideological priorities have 
been re-evaluated and the political and economic 
relations were thoroughly reoriented geographi-
cally. The same happened to the Bulgarian govern-
ments’ approach to internal geopolitics. The most 
fundamental changes occurred in the state’s policy 
towards its Muslim minority, especially towards the 
Turks. In the mid-1980s, at the end of the communist 
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era, the state apparatus began to use various meas-
ures aimed at denationalising and assimilating this 
population, a significant part of which was forced 
to flee to Turkey. As a result, Bulgaria was interna-
tionally isolated. However, when Todor Zhivkov was 
removed from power, the discriminatory laws were 
very quickly removed from the books. Bulgaria has 
become an example of ethnic and religious toler-
ance (Lütem, 1999; Anagnostou, 2005), which has 
undoubtedly become a great asset in the process of 
Euro-Atlantic integration.
Given the fundamental transformation of Bul-
garia’s geopolitical position on the map of Eurasia, 
the article attempts to formulate a synthetic over-
view of the results of this evolution, indicating the 
most significant changes which have taken place in 
1989–2019. It is an important and timely issue, as 
30 years after the political changes, there has been 
a recent increase in Eurocepticism. Just like Poland 
and Hungary, Bulgaria is influenced by an internal, 
heated debate over advantages and disadvantages 
of its presence within the European community and 
the issue of its national sovereignty. One of the main 
reasons for addressing this topic in this article is the 
fact that publications devoted to the geopolitics and 
foreign policy of contemporary Bulgaria are few and 
far between in English-language literature and their 
scope is often limited to repeating general stereo-
types. There have been several comparative analy-
ses of Bulgaria and Romania with an emphasis on 
the countries’ economic problems, their difficulties 
with adopting the EU regulations and their contribu-
tion to NATO military operations (e.g. Linden, 2009), 
as well as publications focused on Bulgaria’s role in 
the security policy in the Balkans and the Black Sea 
region (Tashev, 2005; Triantaphyllou, 2007) and Bul-
garia’s place in modern energy geopolitics (Tchalak-
ov et al., 2013; Maltby, Hiteva, 2017; Tchalakov, Mitev, 
2019).
This article presents and discusses the ideas of 
selected Bulgarian geopoliticians and takes into ac-
count the deeper historical context, which is neces-
sary to understand the complex geopolitical situa-
tion of Bulgaria and its centuries-old attempts to 
conduct multi-vector relations on a European and 
global scale. Without this context, knowledge of 
Bulgaria’s geopolitical identity would be not even in-
complete but simply devoid of objectivity and cog-
nitive depth. These are the factors that are necessary 
to predict possible scenarios of  future actions of the 
state on the international stage.
2. Bulgaria’s geopolitical identification
The geopolitical orientation of each state, Bulgaria’s 
in particular, depends on the dynamics of European 
and world geopolitics, as well as internal political 
and ideological conditions. In the era dominated by 
the confrontation between the Eastern and Western 
Bloc (1945–1990), the socialist identity of Bulgaria, 
and of other Eastern Bloc countries, was the only 
applicable or rather the only possible option. There 
were no alternatives during this period, because 
there was only one geopolitical division in Europe – 
into socialist and capitalist states.
Understanding Bulgaria’s geopolitics is impossi-
ble without knowledge of its long and complicated 
history (the beginnings of the Bulgarian state date 
back to the end of the seventh century), which is 
inextricably linked to Bulgaria’s location within the 
Balkan geopolitical knot, between Europe and Asia, 
at the meeting point between Orthodoxy, Western 
Christianity and Islam. The interests of great pow-
ers have always collided within this complex space. 
These conditions and complex environment, espe-
cially after the end of the nineteenth century, have 
made it impossible to maintain a clear geopoliti-
cal line, with clearly defined allies and enemies, for 
a longer period of time. It is particularly true in the 
case of small and medium-sized countries that are 
unable to conduct independent geopolitical strate-
gies and always have to take into account the inter-
ests of larger, economically and militarily stronger 
countries when defining their own objectives. As 
noted by S. Siedlecka and M. Sułkowski (2017), Bul-
garian compasses point in the West-East direction, 
where West means technology and money, and East 
means raw materials.
V. Krăstev (2008) emphasised that Bulgaria’s 
position in the geopolitical structure of the world 
is determined by several objective premises: the 
geographical location of the state’s territory, the 
neighbouring geopolitical regions (Eurasia, Central 
Europe, Western Europe, Middle East, etc.); its close 
proximity of conflict-driven and unstable regions, 
and location in the heart of the Balkan geopolitical 
knot. The key elements of Bulgaria’s geopolitical po-
tential include the size of its territory (111 thousand 
km2) and population (7 million people in 2018). An-
other indicator is GDP, which shows the country’s 
global economic position. According to the World 
Bank, Bulgaria’s GDP amounted to USD 65 billion in 
2018, which gave the country 74th place among 205 
countries across the world (The Word Bank, nd). All 
these basic data indicate that the rank of Bulgaria’s 
geopolitical position is relatively low, both on the 
global and continental scale. The state’s geopolitical 
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orientation is highly dependent on strong external 
influences, mainly those of great powers (Krăstev, 
2008).
In the early 1990s, many varied, foremost non-
standard suggestions concerning the future place 
of Bulgaria within the political and civilization geog-
raphy of Europe were made both by politicians and 
academics. The place dictates specific geopolitical 
priorities of the state. In the opinion of political sci-
entist Kiril Neshev, Bulgaria’s old strategic path led 
either in the direction of north-west (Germany) or 
north-east (Russia). However, according to Neshev, 
these geostrategic directions did not bring much 
benefit to the country. He did not recommend com-
pletely ignoring the north-west and north-east axes 
in the new post-1990 reality, but recommended sup-
plementing them with another geopolitical direc-
tion – south and southwest, aimed at such countries 
as Greece, Spain or Portugal. This political scientist 
justified his idea by stating that there are more simi-
larities between Bulgarians and southern Europeans 
not only in terms of their temperament and way of 
life, but also in the scope of tradition, culture and 
economy (Neshev, 1994).
In one of the few monographs devoted to the 
political geography of Bulgaria, Todor Hristov com-
bined an analysis of the geopolitical situation of the 
state with an attempt to formulate a list of priorities 
for its geostrategy and foreign policy. According to 
the author, Bulgaria’s main assets are its Black Sea 
coast, which it shares with significant countries, i.e. 
Russia, Ukraine and Turkey, the fact that the national 
territory belongs to the Danube’s geopolitical and 
economic axis, and its location on the routes which 
connect transport corridors with the Baltic region, 
Belarus, Russia, Moldova, Romania and the Aegean 
Sea, as well as Turkey and the Middle East with the 
Balkans and Central and Western Europe (Hristov, 
2001). In the context of the Macedonian-Albanian 
conflict, which began at the dawn of the twenty-first 
century, T. Hristov proposed a non-standard solution 
– reorganisation of Macedonia on a federal basis or 
even establishment of a federation composed of 
Bulgaria, Serbia and Macedonia.
E. Kazakov, a specialist in foreign policy, whose 
research and analytical skills were shaped under the 
influence of the French school of geopolitics, high-
lighted two fundamental aspects of the impact of 
the new post-1990 geopolitical situation on Bulgar-
ia’s foreign policy. First of all, in the strategic foreign 
policy approach, there is a unanimous agreement as 
to the state’s main goal – belonging to the European 
Union. Secondly, the structure of Bulgaria’s foreign 
policy and geostrategic thinking remains divided in 
an antagonistic way. The main geostrategic dividing 
line passes between “neutralists” and “atlanticists”. 
Big differences are also noticeable between “right-
wing” and “left-wing” nationalism. “Left-wing” nation-
alism sees the Orthodox religion and Slavic solidarity 
as values, which makes Russia, Serbia and Greece its 
natural main allies. On the other hand, “right-wing” 
nationalism is excessively focused, especially in his-
toric terms, on Macedonia, defending the thesis of 
the Bulgarian character of its Slavic population. In 
the context of the “right-wing” nationalism, Bulgar-
ia’s opponents and allies are defined solely on the 
basis of the principle stating that “the enemy of my 
enemy is my friend”. As emphasised by Kazakov, this 
is the basis upon which right-wing nationalists have 
identified their enemies (Yugoslavia/Serbia, Greece 
and Russia) and allies (Germany, Croatia and Turkey) 
almost throughout the entire twentieth century (Ka-
zakov, 2007).
Taking into account the dynamics of the situa-
tion in Eurasia and Bulgaria’s position in the interna-
tional arena, S. Ralchev (2015) describes Bulgaria as 
a state with dichotomous identity. On the one hand, 
its membership in NATO and the EU places Bulgaria 
among the countries of the Euro-Atlantic geopoliti-
cal circle whose objectives have been growing in-
creasingly divergent from Russia’s since 2013–2014, 
slowly turning into open distrust and political hostil-
ity. On the other hand, the country remains relatively 
strongly dependant on Russia. This dependency is 
determined by several factors: energy dependence 
(e.g.: Bulgaria imports 90-100% of its natural gas 
from Russia; since 1999 its sole oil refinery is owned 
by Russian Lukoil); Bulgaria is dependent on spare 
parts and maintenance of its military equipment, 
most of it Russian-made; Russian tourists are among 
the most numerous and well-off foreign tourists in 
Bulgaria. The fact that relations between the coun-
tries of the EU-Russia-Turkey have chilled and be-
came more ambiguous has a clear negative impact 
on Bulgaria as a country located on the border be-
tween East and West. The shift is in turn motivated 
by the fact that whenever Bulgarian governments 
and their advisers define strategic geopolitical pri-
orities, they have to strive to maintain equilibrium 
between: (1) its current commitments to its allies 
and democratic values; (2) two Eurasian powers 
with which Bulgarian society has very deep histori-
cal connections and relations, which are additionally 
determined by geography, demography and econo-
my (especially in the energy sector). It can therefore 
be concluded that although the importance of some 
of the above-mentioned premises can be slowly mi-
nimised, they cannot be completely eliminated from 
geopolitical and geohistorical awareness of the Bul-
garian society.
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3. From the closest ally of the Soviet 
Union to a NAto member. Bulgaria’s re-
positioning in the european and global 
geopolitical space
1989 is the beginning of a new historical phase for 
the geopolitics of Bulgaria. However, it its worth to 
start by first identifying the difference between the 
current geopolitics and the strategies which domi-
nated in the previous decades of the twentieth cen-
tury. From the end of the nineteenth century to the 
end of World War II, Bulgaria was politically, militarily 
and economically connected with Germany and Aus-
tria, which it supported during both world wars. In 
September 1944, the communists, who had hitherto 
constituted the main force acting against the pro-
German regime, seized control of the country with 
the help of the Red Army, which did not in fact carry 
out war operations on the territory of Bulgaria. Tens 
of thousands of pre-war politicians, entrepreneurs 
and intellectuals who were associated or suspected 
of having ties with Western European countries, not 
only fascist Germany, were removed from power, 
and often killed. This was the context in which a new 
socialist identity was imposed on Bulgaria, and the 
state spent 45 years as a member of the communist 
bloc. At that time, Bulgaria became the state which 
had the closest relation with the Soviet Union.
After 1989, a new radical concept was formed 
in accordance to which Bulgarians had to make 
a “civilisational choice” between the “liberal and rich” 
Euro-Atlantic West and the “totalitarian and poorer” 
Russia. The freedom, prosperity and security of Bul-
garians depended, and still depends, on this choice. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the state’s foreign 
policy has gradually begun to support the priorities 
of Western powers and their approach to solving ur-
gent international problems, including those taking 
place beyond the Bulgarian western border. The old 
ideology of the Slavic and Orthodox “brotherhood” 
was forgotten, giving way to cool-headed pragma-
tism, and the government supported NATO’s inter-
vention in Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999. This po-
sition was most accurately summed up in the then 
political slogan – “NATO – yes, Milošević – no”. The 
right-wing nationalists (in Kazakov’s understanding 
of the term) were in power at that point. Still, most of 
the population strongly opposed the use of military 
to resolve the conflict. However, after the end of the 
Cold War, Bulgaria’s traditional enemy and historical 
partitioner, Turkey, became one of its most signifi-
cant geopolitical and geoeconomic partners. Since 
the very beginning of Bulgaria’s political transfor-
mation, the country’s bilateral relations with Ankara 
have been based on an unprecedentedly positive 
and open dialogue. The two countries are also con-
nected by their membership in NATO (Mihaylov, 
2010a, 2010b).
After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Bulgaria 
had to reorient itself in the new security situation 
and decided to focus on the NATO membership. 
After joining this organisation in 2004, Bulgaria be-
came a member of the largest military alliance in the 
world, seven years after the country’s membership 
aspirations had been first announced by its then 
president. Political circles which immediately after 
1989 opposed such a solution, fearing that it may 
lead to a direct confrontation with Russia, have long 
reconciled with Bulgaria’s NATO membership. The 
country took part in military operations in Afghani-
stan, Iraq and Afghanistan, and four military bases 
were created on the territory of Bulgaria, primarily 
used by the US. Those who oppose NATO bases in 
Bulgaria, usually leftist in their political orientations, 
are critical of foreign bases, arguing that even during 
the communist era, there was no Soviet army, rep-
resenting the “Big Brother” of the time, stationed in 
Bulgaria. A similar response arose in mid-2019, when 
a contract was signed for the purchase of eight 
American F-16 Block 70 fighters, which are to be de-
livered by the end of 2023, with eight more arriving 
in the future. The public opinion does not oppose 
the idea of purchasing a new generation of fighters 
for the Bulgarian air force to replace the outdated 
and depleted Russian air planes. Still, a heat discus-
sion arose in response to the high price of the fight-
ers ($ 1.256 billion), which was especially strongly 
criticised by left-wing president, Rumen Radev, 
a general and military pilot. Additionally, some part 
of the public opinion opposed the deal due to unfa-
vourable conditions, i.e. the requirement to prepay 
the entire amount, which forced an update of the 
state budget.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, 
external relations with the European Union are the 
most important in both political and economic 
terms. The rapprochement and integration with 
the European community was the leading prior-
ity of the state after the fall of communism (tab. 
1). When Bulgaria acceded to the EU on 1 January 
2007, some state politicians described this event as 
the most achievement achievement in the long na-
tional history. Compared to the first half of the twen-
tieth century, the direction of the Western Bulgarian 
geopolitics was significantly diversified in the post-
communist period. There have been some changes 
in relations with the West, which were dictated by 
the new distribution of forces within this geopoliti-
cal and cultural circle. The United States’s presence 
in the Southeastern Europe became significant only 
16  Valentin Mihaylov
in the 1990s. Washington took over from Germany, 
France and the UK, who used to set the pace for 
Europe for more than a century, especially in the 
field of security. These European states’ indecisive 
reaction and policy towards the Yugoslav Wars, the 
EU’s in particular, was a sure signal that, in both po-
litical and military terms, Western European powers’ 
role in this region would decrease. Traditionally, for 
Bulgaria, orientation towards the West meant an al-
liance with Germany, because their geostrategic in-
terests were divergent with the interests of Bulgaria’s 
regional enemies. France, in turn, traditionally sup-
ported the aspirations of Romania, and Serbia/Yugo-
slavia, while the United Kingdom offered its backing 
to Greece. Despite some economic benefits, such as 
supply of modern military equipment or fostering of 
social modernisation of Bulgaria, the alliances from 
the first half of the twentieth century have always 
resulted in failures. Sofia failed to achieve its geo-
strategic goals in their entirety, losing territories to 
Romania, Yugoslavia and Greece.
It is worth mentioning Bulgaria’s relations with 
another power. In 1985 Sir Jeffrey Howe became the 
first British foreign secretary to visit Bulgaria in the 
twentieth century (Curtis (ed.), 1992). As K. Metodiev 
stresses, Bulgaria has never been among Britain’s 
foreign policy priorities as it has been underlined 
in numerous statements by British diplomats, re-
searchers and politicians. All neighbour countries, 
with no exception, traditionally have maintained 
a closer relationship to London. British-Bulgarian 
relations started to change gradually, together with 
Bulgarian application for a membership in EU in the 
middle of 1990s (Metodiev, 2015). But, in spite of this 
changes which were mainly symbolic ones, political 
and economic relations with the United Kingdom do 
not matter much for Sofia as they are with Germany, 
United States, Russia or Turkey. The exception is the 
process of formation of a relatively large Bulgarian 
emigrant population in Great Britain in the last 10–
15 years.
Despite its membership in the EU and NATO, Bul-
garia remains a country where the influences and 
interests of several geopolitical centres intersect. 
This divisions are visible in the stated geopolitical 
priorities of the country’s leading political parties 
and in the politics and positions adopted by many 
mass media and non-governmental organisations 
in international politics. Some of the most active 
foundations and media operating in the country are 
financed by Western foundations (mainly German 
and American) and use anti-Russian rhetoric when 
commenting on ideological, military and economic 
issues. In turn, other institutions are directly or in-
directly financed by Russian entities, especially by 
known oligarchs or energy companies operating in 
Bulgaria. They argue that deepening cooperation 
with Russia would bring economic benefits to the 
country and work to undermine Bulgaria’s attempts 
to deepen its Euro-Atlantic integration. A serious 
scandal occurred in September 2019, when the lead-
ers of the so-called “Russophiles”, considered to be 
one of the largest NGOs in the country, were accused 
of spying on behalf of Russia and trying to turn Bul-
garia away from the West.
Relations with Russia have always been an im-
portant element of the national socio-psychological 
discourse. The only exceptions are Macedonia and 
the EU as a whole. There are more Russia-focused 
scientific and media publications than publications 
about any other country. It should be remembered 
that after several unsuccessful uprisings, Bulgaria 
finally gained its independence from the Ottoman 
Empire at the end of the nineteenth century with 
the help of Russia. Despite this, in the years immedi-
ately following the Russian-Turkish war (1877–1878), 
there was rapid reorientation towards Germany and 
Austria-Hungary. This behaviour is in line with Bul-
garia’s traditional pragmatism in the international 
sphere, not only in relation to political, but also mili-
tary and economic issues.
After 1990, relations with Russia went into 
a slump. However, despite the chosen pro-Western 
Tab. 1. Major post-1989 events of Bulgaria’s geopolitics and its international relations
Date event
10 November 1989 The collapse of the communist regime; Todor Zhivkov is removed from power
04 April 1991 Establishment of the Bulgarian Atlantic Club – the first non-government organisation of this type 
in a non-NATO country 
14 February 1994 Bulgaria joins the Partnership for Peace programme
14 December 1995 Application for EU membership
15 February 2000 Commencement of negotiations concerning Bulgaria’s membership in the European Union
29 March 2004 Bulgaria joins NATO
01 January 2007 Accession to the European Union
Source: elaborated by the Author.
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course, Bulgaria’s geopolitics and some of its tactical 
foreign policy decisions always had a very specific 
character in the context of relations with Russia. Un-
like Poland, Lithuania, Estonia or Ukraine, Bulgaria 
has never been part of the Russian Empire or the 
Soviet Union. For this and other reasons, the image 
of Russia does not evoke as strong anti-Russian re-
sentments. Bulgarians and Russians share a com-
mon religion and use the same Cyrillic alphabet, 
which, importantly, originates from medieval Bul-
garia. However, it does not mean that Bulgarians 
would always opt for a political or economic alliance 
with Russia. It should also be taken into account that 
there have always been large, determined and influ-
ential anti-Russian circles in Bulgaria, which did not 
accept Russia’s political and social system or any fur-
ther rapprochement between the two countries in 
terms of politics and security. The exception was the 
communist period, when pro-Western groups were 
eliminated from social life.
During the post-communist transition, and es-
pecially after joining the EU, a political and media 
discourse developed which criticised Bulgaria for its 
“insufficient gratitude” towards Russia for its role in 
the revival of the Bulgarian state in the second half 
of the nineteenth century. Key representatives of the 
Russian state and society tend to have a paternalis-
tic or even disregarding attitude towards Bulgaria. 
For example, in 2016, Pyotr Tolstoy, a well-known 
TV journalist and MP, representing the United Rus-
sia party, almost caused a diplomatic scandal when 
he stated the following: “We will soon buy the entire 
Bulgaria. We have already bought a half of the coast” 
(Ruski deputat...).
Out of all other global powers, the one which 
shows the greatest potential for political and eco-
nomic influence is China, which has only recently 
become more active in Bulgaria. Just as in the case 
of the other Balkan states, Beijing’s influence is 
mainly limited to the economic sphere, especially 
projects concerning energy, infrastructure, as well as 
rail and sea transport (Sokolov, 2016). At the begin-
ning of the twenty-first century, China has become 
one of Bulgaria’s top ten trading partners, mainly as 
the result of significant imports from this country. 
The trade balance is clearly negative from Bulgaria’s 
point of view, with the deficit of almost 300 million 
dollars (2018).
4. Zero problems with neighbours. 
the regional geopolitical relations 
of Bulgaria
It is worth to begin this section by commenting 
briefly on the regional aspects of Bulgarian geopoli-
tics, although they are not the primary topic of this 
article. After all, it is a sphere in which Bulgaria still 
has some resources and persuasive tools to con-
duct its own policy in the field of energy, transport, 
protection of minority rights, and regulation of dis-
puted historical issues, etc. With the exception of 
Turkey, other countries with which Bulgaria shares 
a common border (Macedonia, Serbia, Romania 
and Greece) are inhabited mostly by nations which 
are ethnically, linguistically or religiously related to 
Bulgarians.
Because of Turkey’s growing significance, it is very 
important for Bulgaria, and the Balkans as a whole, 
to maintain a constructive dialogue between Brus-
sels and Ankara (Sokolov, 2016). This is even truer 
nowadays when the migration route from the Mid-
dle East to Western Europe passes through Bulgaria, 
and there are about 3 million refugees in Turkey. Bul-
garia itself was affected by the refugee crisis, which 
reached its peak in 2015, when the largest number 
of refugees submitted their applications for asylum. 
In the face of the great number of refugees, the Bul-
garian state built costly, over 230-kilometre-long 
fence on its border with Turkey.
A new, ambitious course of Turkey’s foreign pol-
icy emerged in the 1980s. Turkey has shown great 
progress in science, technology and economics, be-
coming a modern role model for the countries of the 
former Ottoman sphere of influence. From the Turk-
ish perspective, those are precisely the countries on 
which Turkey should focus in its geopolitical efforts, 
especially those related to economy (Hinkova, 2014).
One of the most important conditions conducive 
to the Turkish influence on Bulgaria is the fact that 
the country has a large Turkish minority which rep-
resent about 9.0% of its population. Citing a study 
conducted among this ethnic minority, S. Hinkova 
(2014) noted that they have great respect for Turkey, 
especially ethnic Turks and Pomaks. What is more, 
respondents to the study emphasised Turkey’s suc-
cessful economic development and higher salaries 
earned by their relatives and friends who live in Tur-
key. The Muslim minority in Bulgaria unanimously 
considers Turkey to be a positive lifestyle model.
However, because of the 500-year rule of the Ot-
toman Empire over the Bulgarian lands and the in-
hibition of the country’s civilisational development, 
the anti-Turkish ideology is one of the pillars of the 
modern Bulgarian identity. It is still firmly rooted in 
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people’s consciousness (Mihaylov, 2015). Nonethe-
less, at the beginning of the twenty-first century Bul-
garia is probably the only neighbour of Turkey that 
maintains normal relations with this country, meet-
ing all the requirements required by the modern 
democratic standards (Lütem, 1999; Bishku, 2003; 
Rusev, 2006). Many post-1989 Bulgarian govern-
ments and most political groups have demonstrated 
openness and willingness to cooperate with Turkey. 
This is a further proof that pragmatism plays an im-
portant role in the Bulgarian geopolitics and foreign 
policy. However, the Bulgarian state and secret ser-
vices are closely following some of the Turkish state’s 
actions in the country, as Ankara finances Muslim 
parties and organisations in Bulgaria and regularly 
intervenes in parliamentary and local elections.
As M. Sokolov states (2016), while Turkey is 
a NATO member, its relationship with Moscow can 
change the political environment in the whole Bal-
kan region. With realisation of Turkish Stream and 
the renewed friendship between Presidents Erdo-
gan and Putin it is uncertain what this will mean for 
Bulgaria and the Balkan states.
Conceptually, instead of an open confrontation, 
in the first half of the 20th century, Bulgaria chose 
to apply the tactics of modern Turkey and its poli-
cy known as “zero problems with neighbours”. This 
approach is evident, for example, in Bulgaria’s ap-
proach towards Macedonia, which it accuses of fal-
sifying history, but still treats much mildly than, for 
example, Greece. The exception to this rule was the 
above-mentioned lack of solidarity with Serbia dur-
ing the breakup of Yugoslavia, although contem-
porary relations between the two countries are un-
doubtedly positive. Bulgaria’s relations with Greece 
and Romania are also constructive and friendly. In 
the past, these two neighbouring countries and Ser-
bia have been the traditional enemies of the state 
which together pursued anti-Bulgarian policy and in 
the twentieth century became the main obstacle on 
the path to the complete unification of the Bulgarian 
lands. Today, however, Bulgaria does make any ter-
ritorial claims against its neighbours (and neither do 
them) and managed to establish with them proper 
partnership-like relations within the EU and NATO.
 Macedonia (North Macedonia) still remains 
the country which evokes the greatest emotional 
response in the context of Bulgaria’s geopolitics. His-
torically, Bulgarians have long had a complex about 
Macedonia. This complex is among the biggest ob-
stacles on Bulgaria’s road to achieving its geopo-
litical goals (Pavlov, 1999). Bulgaria’s relations with 
Macedonia gained new quality and dynamism after 
the breakup of Yugoslavia. At that time, the Bulgar-
ian authorities demonstrated their independence 
in the realm of foreign policy. Bulgaria became the 
first country in the world to recognize Macedonia’s 
independence on 15 January 1992. Despite this 
gesture, many unresolved and controversial issues 
still plague the Bulgarian-Macedonian relations, es-
pecially matters regarding their common history, 
genesis of the language and identity of the Mace-
donian nation which has been traditionally treated 
in a paternalistic manner by Bulgarians, as a regional 
faction of the Bulgarian nation. Already in 2006, the 
then President and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bul-
garia made it clear that the country’s support for the 
European integration of Macedonia would depend 
on Skopje’s willingness to pursue a policy of good 
neighbourly relations (Bozhinov, Stoyanova-Toneva, 
2018). Even more so, as both the EU and NATO re-
quire their candidates for members to resolve all ter-
ritorial disputes in the accession process.
The two agreements for friendships signed in 
1999 and 2017 respectively were to help solve prob-
lems in the Bulgarian-Macedonian relations during 
the transformation years. The signing of these agree-
ments was a testimony to the temporary goodwill of 
the leaders of both countries, but the documents did 
not resolve any of the difficult issues. According to V. 
Bozhinov and Y. Stoyanova-Toneva (2018), Bulgaria 
should set at least several requirements before sign-
ing any agreements for good neighbourly relations 
with Macedonia – renovation of Bulgarian cultural 
monuments, honouring the memory of thousands 
of Bulgarians who gave their lives in the struggle for 
national liberation, and stop of harassment of Mace-
donian citizens who identify as Bulgarians (police 
interrogations, dismissals from work, no possibil-
ity to freely express their views). Relations between 
Bulgaria and Macedonia should be regulated on the 
basis of bilateral agreements, which should become 
part of Macedonia’s future EU accession treaty.
5. Reorientation of Bulgaria’s economic ties 
and undecided attempts to change its 
energy geopolitics
As part of the global economy, Bulgaria has signifi-
cantly diversified the number of its foreign trading 
partners. The change in geopolitical priorities went 
hand in hand with the diversification of export di-
rections. Significantly, in 1985, Bulgaria maintained 
trading relations with 113 countries, while 20 years 
later (2005), the number of its trading partners in-
creased to 206. 30 years after the system change, the 
national economy became more open and flexible 
(Nestorov, 2002).
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Until 1990, the Soviet Union and the countries 
of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (fig. 
1 and 2) dominated Bulgaria’s foreign trade (84.5% 
of total export and 76.7% of total import). Russia’s 
importance has been gradually decreasing until it 
was significantly reduced, mainly through the loss 
of the Russian/Soviet market for Bulgarian agricul-
tural, pharmaceutical, electrotechnical and other 
products. As shown in fig. 3, in 2018, Russia’s share 
in Bulgarian export amounted to mere 1.4%, which 
proves that the significance of this former main trad-
ing partner is now incomparably smaller, especially 
in comparison with Germany, and the EU countries 
in general.
The significant share of raw materials and energy 
resources is definitely a drawback of Bulgaria’s for-
eign trade, with a clear trade deficit on the state’s 
side. The country’s share in world trade is definitely 
weaker when it comes to consumer goods. A large 
part of the foreign trade deficit is caused by the neg-
ative trade balance with the post-Soviet countries, 
mainly with Russia and Ukraine, which supply 3/4 of 
all of Bulgaria’s imported energy resources (Levkov, 
2013).
In total, export to European Union countries 
amounts to more than 52.0% of all country’s export, 
while import to the EU members represents over 
70.0% (Fig. 4). Thus, Bulgaria also has a negative 
trade balance in relation to this group of countries. 
The share of EU countries in Bulgaria’s trade in con-
sumer goods is particularly high (over 70.0%) (Lev-
kov, 2013).
Energy policy, especially the supply of Russian 




















Fig. 1. Structure of Bulgaria’s export in 1988, by economic partners
Source: elaborated by the Author on the basis of: National…, nd; Nestorov, 2002.
Fig. 2. Structure of Bulgaria’s export in 2018, by economic partners
Source: elaborated by the Author on the basis of: National…, nd; Nestorov, 2002.
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Bulgaria-EU-Russia triangle. The European Union, as 
the world’s largest importer of the above-mentioned 
energy sources, seeks to diversify the supply sources. 
How do Bulgaria’s interests and possibilities fit into 
this situation?
Although Bulgaria did not give up other en-
ergy projects, there was some rapprochement with 
Russia in the field of strategic energy projects dur-
ing the presidency of left-lining Georgi Parvanov 
(2002–2012). In 2008, the then president announced 
Bulgaria’s winning “Grand Slam” strategy, which in-
volved contracts signed with Russia for the construc-
tion of the South Stream gas pipeline, the Burgas-
Alexandroupolis pipeline and the second Bulgarian 
nuclear power plant in Belene. These projects were 
to solidify Bulgaria’s role as an energy centre in the 
Balkans. The Bulgarian state was to profit, especially 
through the transit of Russian gas to Italy and Aus-
tria. Bulgaria and other member states felt the con-
sequences of the imperfect EU energy policy in the 
winter of 2009, during suspension of the Russian gas 
supplies to Europe. Bulgaria was one of the most af-
fected countries. It was a clear signal to join the de-
bate concerning the common EU energy policy, as 
individual member states are unable to solve this 
problem on their own (Pargov et al., 2009). After 
breaks in supplies of Russian gas, which had a seri-
ous impact on the national economy, it became 
clear that the vision of Bulgaria’s future as an energy 
centre of the Balkans would not be possible to im-
plement in the near future.
The most important challenges for Bulgarian en-
ergy geopolitics include completion of the construc-





















Fig. 3. Structure of Bulgaria’s import in 1988, by economic partners
Source: elaborated by the Author on the basis of: National…, nd; Nestorov, 2002.
Fig. 4. Structure of Bulgaria’s import in 2018, by economic partners
Source: elaborated by the Author on the basis of: National…, nd; Nestorov, 2002.
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2016, the International Court of Arbitration of the 
International Chamber of Commerce in Geneva is-
sued a verdict that Bulgaria’s National Electric Com-
pany must pay Russian company Rosatom 550 mil-
lion euros for the ordered nuclear reactors. Bulgaria 
resigned from the purchase of these reactors after 
deciding to cancel the plan to construct the sec-
ond nuclear power plant. Finally, in 2017, both Rus-
sian reactors were transported to Belene. After the 
tender announced by the Bulgarian government in 
mid-2019, several candidates submitted their ten-
der bids for the power plant construction, including 
Rosatom, the Chinese National Nuclear Company, 
and Korean Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. Additionally, 
French company Framatome and General Electric 
are interested in supplying equipment for the new 
power plant.
Currently, there are several projects underway, 
at various implementation stages, whose objective 
is to diversify Bulgaria’s gas suppliers. The “Balkan” 
gas hub project has received support from the Eu-
ropean Commission. The goal of this project is to 
connect the most important gas pipelines in South-
eastern Europe and to guarantee transparent access 
to a wide range of suppliers, with the exception of 
Russian ones who have declared that they will not 
participate in this project in any way.
Another project which is meant to contribute 
to the making the gas market more competitive is 
the Turkey–Bulgaria gas interconnector (ITB) – a gas 
pipeline with an annual capacity of about 3 billion 
m3 and a length of almost 200 km. 75 of those ki-
lometres will be located on the territory of Bulgaria. 
ITB is expected to be completed by 2022. There is 
one biggest project that is to be completed by the 
same date. In 2018, an agreement was signed to im-
plement a gas interconnector between Bulgaria and 
Serbia. Aside from other advantages, this project will 
provide opportunities for gas imports from Serbia in 
the event of suspension of supplies from Russia. The 
gas pipeline connecting Sofia with Serbian Niš will 
have a length of 170 km, and its capacity is estimat-
ed to be between 1.8 and 3.2 billion m³.
Out of all the discussed group of energy projects, 
the construction of the interconnector between Bul-
garia and Greece (IGB) is the most advanced. The 
route of this gas pipeline (from Stara Zagora in Bul-
garia to the Greek Komotini) is 140-kilometre-long. 
According to the Bulgarian Ministry of Energy, its an-
nual capacity will be between 3 and 5.5 billion m3.
In addition to the above-listed initiatives, Bul-
garia is taking part in the “Eastring” project which 
it plans to implement together with Slovakia, Hun-
gary and Romania. This project is also supported by 
the European Union and its objective is to search 
for alternative gas sources and ensure secure gas 
supplies for the countries of the region (Bălgaria…, 
2019).
The most crucial issue remains – what gas will 
flow through these pipelines? It is quite possible that 
in many cases it will be Russian gas. All the more so, 
because in September 2019, the Russian Minister of 
Energy signed a contract with the Bulgarian govern-
ment for building the section of the Turkish Stream 
gas pipeline which goes from the Turkish border to 
the border with Serbia.
Despite all the declarations, intentions and new 
energy initiatives, in 2019, just as 30 years earlier, al-
most all of Bulgaria’s imported oil and gas came from 
Russia. The concept of Bulgaria as an energy centre 
of the Balkans turned out to be a pipe-dream. All 
major international projects for the transit of natural 
gas or oil through the national territory (e.g. Nabuc-
co, Burgas-Alexandroupolis, South Stream) have 
failed to materialise, and the earliest date for the 
launch of the second nuclear power plant is 2030. 
Bulgaria is still counting on more decisive support 
from Western partners in strategic sectors, such as 
natural gas supply and nuclear energy. For example, 
the fact that investments of EU countries in energy, 
or support and promotion of “second-hand” ener-
gy projects, such as gas hubs, and interconnectors 
(Marinov, 2017), are very limited leaves an opening 
for other players, mainly Russia and China.
6. Conclusions
This article presents a synthetic overview of the pro-
cess of Bulgaria’s post-1989 geopolitical reorienta-
tion and its consequences. The model based on the 
variability of geopolitical priorities was once again 
confirmed in the analysed period. It is based on prag-
matism, which is traditional for the national political 
elite, and the search for the optimal configuration of 
relations with great powers. Bulgaria has always had 
to bear in mind the interests of the Balkans states 
and the multilateral pressure of great powers. At the 
end of the nineteenth and throughout the entire 
twentieth century, Bulgarian governments followed 
the tactic of joining any coalition which would en-
sure implementation of the project of unification 
of Bulgarian lands. At various times, Bulgaria’s allies 
included Russia, Germany, Austria, and, during the 
First World War, even Turkey. After 1989, Bulgaria’s 
foreign partners in the fields of politics, economy, 
culture and science became more diversified.
Compared to the early years of transformation, 
in 2019 Bulgaria is a politically stable country with 
clear foreign policy priorities and geopolitical allies. 
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Economic and political life, as well as the external 
relations of the country, are influenced by Russia 
(although its influence is incomparably weaker than 
during the Cold War period) and Turkey (whose in-
fluence increased significantly during this period). 
Despite its geographical location at the historical 
civilizational, economic and political crossroad, Bul-
garia is an internally stable and predictable partner 
within the Euro-Atlantic community. At the same 
time, the number of threats to national security is 
increasing in the area of South-Eastern Europe, the 
Black Sea region and the broader contact zone be-
tween Europe, Asia and Africa. Because of the deci-
sive role of external factors, the Yugoslavian knot is 
currently in its peaceful phase. However, the area still 
includes several countries that do not have a well-
established geopolitical orientation and are still not 
fully internally consolidated. The war in Syria and 
the migration crisis have had a significant impact on 
the Balkan geopolitics. The Caucasian geopolitical 
knot is also located near the region. Other potential 
threats for Bulgaria include the radicalisation and 
Islamisation of Turkish society and Turkey’s growing 
economic and cultural influence, especially among 
the Muslim population in Bulgaria. The tense situa-
tion concerning Crimea and relations between Rus-
sia and Ukraine, which are very important countries 
from the point of view of geopolitical rivalry in the 
Black Sea region, also indirectly affect Bulgaria and 
require rethinking of its security strategy.
A general overview of Bulgarian geopolitics from 
1878 to the present allows to draw one more general 
conclusion. Bulgaria’s geopolitics are only tangen-
tially based on history, or such links as a common 
language or civilisation. The decisive factors include 
foremost temporary interests of the state and a de-
sire for alliances that, in the subjective opinion of the 
national authorities, can bring the greatest political 
and economic benefits.
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